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DISMISSAL OF TENURED FACULTY
MEMBERS FOR REASONS OF
FINANCIAL EXIGENCY
T. ICHAEL BOLGER*
DAVID D. WILMOTH**
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has held that a college
faculty member dismissed from a tenured appointment has an
interest in continued employment that is safeguarded by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' Further,
where private schools are involved and even in the absence of
"state action," courts have been quick to find that a tenured
faculty member has a contractual right to due process upon
dismissal.2 Therefore, a tenured professor whom university of-
* B.A., Marquette University; M.A., Ph.L., St. Louis University; J.D., Northwest-
ern University. Mr. Bolger is a member of the State Bar of Wisconsin and a partner
in the Milwaukee law firm of Quarles & Brady.
* * B.A., University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee; J.D., Marquette University. Mr.
Wilmoth is a member of the State Bar of Wisconsin and an associate in the Milwau-
kee law firm of Quarles & Brady.
1. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551
(1956).
As the title and introduction indicate, the scope of this article encompasses dis-
missals of tenured faculty only. Tenure may be defined as a legal entitlement to con-
tinued employment, terminable only for cause, such as incompetence or moral turpi-
tude, or for reasons of financial exigency. See, e.g., Gray, Higher Education
Litigation: Financial Exigency, 14 U.S.F.L. Rav. 375 (1980). The term "tenure" as
used herein is meant to include not only formal tenure, but also de facto tenure as
recognized in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
The Supreme Court has held that a nontenured faculty member has no constitu-
tionally protected property interest in employment beyond the duration of his em-
ployment contract. Thus, he may be refused reemployment without being afforded a
hearing or a statement of reasons for nonrenewal so long as: (1) the nonrenewal is not
based upon constitutionally protected activity; (2) no charges of misconduct are made
so as to give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest; and (3) neither the
state law nor faculty member's employment contract provide for a pretermination
hearing.
2. See, e.g., Krotkoff v. Goucher College, 585 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1978) where a
tenured faculty member dismissed from a private college was held to have the full
panoply of due process rights on the theory that such rights were explicitly or implic-
itly a part of the college's tenure system. It is important to realize that private uni-
versities may, under certain circumstances, be engaged in "state action" when dis-
misssing a faculty member. In such cases, the fourteenth amendment would apply.
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ficials seek to dismiss is generally entitled to a hearing at
which he is informed of the grounds for his dismissal and has
an opportunity to challenge their sufficiency.$ As a rule, the
dismissal of a tenured faculty member may properly be based
only upon cause - either what has been referred to as "ade-
quate cause" or the existence of a bona fide "financial
exigency. '
With increasing regularity, colleges, universities and courts
all have faced legal problems connected with terminations
based upon financial exigency. An increasing rate of inflation,
declining enrollments, legislative budget cuts and diminishing
public and private grants have geometrically contributed to
this phenomenon. The authority to terminate tenured faculty
members because of an economic crisis is an important tool to
college administrators in maintaining fiscal stability. However,
it offers a possible pretext for dismissal stemming from con-
duct which would otherwise be protected by the institution's
tenure provisions. Consequently, in order to preserve the
financial integrity of educational institutions and at the same
time protect and promote academic freedom, courts must
See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 581 (1972) (Douglas, J. dissenting) (stat-
ing that the extent to which actions by a private institution constitutes "state action"
depends upon the amount of state and federal funding supplied to the institution).
See also Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 927 (1975); Buckton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 366 F.Supp. 1152 (D.
Mass. 1973)..
3. See, e.g., Johnson v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis. 1974), aff'd
mem., 510 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1975).
4. While tenure creates a constitutionally protected property interest in continued
employment, the parameters of such an interest are established not by the Constitu-
tion, but rather, by the terms of the grant of tenure. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 577 (1972) the Supreme Court observed:
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they
are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understand-
ings that stem from an independent source such as state law - rules or under-
standings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to
those benefits.
Many of the "independent rules and understandings" which regulate the granting of
tenure, such as state statutes and university by-laws, provide that a faculty member
may be dismissed only for "adequate cause" or for reasons of "financial exigency."
Where such rules refer only to cause, courts have held that the power to dismiss for
reasons of financial exigency is either subsumed in the notion of cause or is an inher-
ent power of university officials. See infra text accompanying notes 5-23.
5. See R. PHAY, REDUCTION IN FORCE: LEGAL IssuEs AND RECOMMENDED POLICY 1-4
(1980).
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carefully balance the need of the institution to cope effectively
with a bona fide financial crisis against the tenured faculty
member's contractual or constitutional right to continued em-
ployment. In order for a court to balance effectively these two
conflicting interests, it must necessarily consider the following
three questions: (1) What is the nature of a university's au-
thority to terminate faculty members for reasons of financial
exigency? (2) What constitutes financial exigency and, correl-
atively, what is a bona fide response to it? (3) What process is
due a faculty member dismissed for reasons of financial exi-
gency, and who bears the burden of proving the presence or
absence of financial exigency?
II. AUTHORITY TO TERMINATE FOR REASONS OF FINANCIAL
EXIGENCY
Many universities have tenure plans granting administra-
tors authority to terminate tenured faculty members for rea-
sons of financial exigency.' This is true of public as well as
private educational institutions.7 However, a significant num-
ber of colleges and universities have made no provision in
their tenure plans for dismissals based upon financial exi-
gency." The absence of such provisions has not necessarily
meant that college administrators are entirely without author-
ity to act where financial difficulties dictate that tenured
faculty members be terminated. On the contrary, recent deci-
sions indicate that college administrators possess an inherent
authority to dismiss tenured faculty members for reasons of
financial exigency whether or not their tenure plans specifi-
cally provide such authority.9
6. See Browzin v. Catholic Univ., 527 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Scheuer v.
Creighton Univ., 199 Neb. 618, 260 N.W.2d 595 (1977); AAUP v. Bloomfield College,
129 N.J. Super. 249, 322 A.2d 846 (1974), aff'd, 136 N.J. Super. 442, 346 A.2d 615
(App. Div. 1975).
7. See, e.g., University of Alaska v. Chauvin, 521 P.2d 1234 (Alaska 1974); Abram-
son v. Board of Regents, 56 Hawaii 680, 548 P.2d 253 (1976).
8. See Krotkoff v. Goucher College, 585 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1978); Graney v. Board
of Regents, 92 Wis. 2d 745, 286 N.W.2d 138 (Ct. App. 1979).
9. See, e.g., Krotkoff v. Goucher College, 585 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1978); Johnson v.
Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis. 1974), aff'd mem., 510 F.2d 975 (7th
Cir. 1975); Graney v. Board of Regents, 92 Wis. 2d 745, 286 N.W.2d 138 (Ct. App.
1979).
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In Krotkoff v. Goucher College,10 Ms. Krotkoff had been
hired to teach at Goucher College in 1962 and was granted
tenure in 1967. The college by-laws specified with admirable
brevity that a teacher's employment could be terminated "at
age 65 or because of serious disability or cause."'" The by-laws
contained no other provisions regarding termination of em-
ployment. In June of 1975, the college notified Ms. Krotkoff
that because of financial problems, her 1975-76 contract
would not be renewed when it expired in June of 1976. Ms.
Krotkoff brought an action against the college claiming, inter
alia, that the by-laws did not give the college the authority to
terminate her employment for reasons of financial exigency.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
began its evaluation of Ms. Krotkoff's claim by noting that
the "national academic community's understanding of the
concept of tenure incorporates the notion that a college may
refuse to renew a tenured teacher's contract because of
financial exigency so long as its action is demonstrably bona
fide.' 1 2 The court found three bases for its conclusion. First,
the Director of the Office of Academic Affairs of the American
Council on Education had testified at trial that it was a "com-
mon understanding" in the academic community that a
teacher with tenure would be employed for an indefinite pe-
riod up to retirement, unless there was sufficient cause for dis-
missal, death,, disability or financial exigency. Second, the
court observed that the 1940 Statement of Principles on Aca-
demic Freedom and Tenure formulated by the Association of
American Colleges and the American Association of Univer-
sity Professors (AAUP) specifically provided for termination
of tenured faculty members in the event of financial exigency.
Finally, the court found that several courts already had con-
strued tenure as implicitly granting colleges the right to make
bona fide dismissals for financial reasons,"3 while no court had
10. 585 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1978).
11. Id. at 678.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 679. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Johnson v. Board of
Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis. 1974), aff'd mem., 510 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1975);
Levitt v. Board of Trustees, 376 F. Supp. 945 (D. Neb. 1974).
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held that financial exigency could not form a proper basis for
dismissal of tenured faculty.14
The Krotkoff court observed that a concept of tenure
which permits dismissal based on financial exigency is consis-
tent with the essential purpose of tenure, that is, protection of
the teaching profession's freedom of inquiry and instruction. 15
Dismissals based on financial exigency, unlike those for
cause or disability, are impersonal; they are unrelated to the
views of the dismissed teachers. A professor whose appoint-
ment is terminated because of financial exigency will not be
replaced by another with more conventional views or better
connections. Hence, bona fide dismissals based on financial
exigency do not threaten the values protected by tenure. 6
While granting that the parties to a contract could define ten-
ure differently, the court found that there was no evidence
that Ms. Krotkoff and the college had contracted with any
particular understanding of tenure and, therefore, the con-
tract could not exempt her from demonstrably bona fide dis-
missal if the college confronted a financial emergency.
While Krotkoff dealt with a grant of tenure defined by an
employment contract in the context of a private college,
courts have reached identical conclusions when considering
statutes defining tenure as it applies to state universities. In
Johnson v. Board of Regents, 7 for example, a federal district
judge expressed the opinion that although section 37.31(1)18 of
the Wisconsin Statutes provided that a tenured teacher could
not be discharged except for cause, Wisconsin courts presum-
ably would hold that colleges have the power to dismiss ten-
ured faculty because of financial exigency.19
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals recently had the opportu-
nity to consider this precise question in Graney v. Board of
14. 585 F.2d at 679.
15. Id. at 679-80. See also Browzin v. Catholic Univ., 527 F.2d 843, 846 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Note, Dismissal of Tenured Faculty for Reasons of Financial Exigency, 51
IND. L.J. 417 (1976).
16. 585 F.2d at 680.
17. 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis. 1974), aff'd mem., 510 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1975).
18. Wis. STAT. § 37.31(1) (1971) provided in pertinent part: "(b) The employment
of a teacher who has become permanently employed under this section may not be
terminated involuntarily, except for cause upon written charges."
19. 377 F. Supp. at 234-35.
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Regents.20 In Graney, a number of tenured faculty members
at the University of Wisconsin were dismissed in the spring of
1973 because of an alleged financial exigency. The teachers
brought suit challenging the dismissal on the grounds that
section 37.31 did not give the Board of Regents the authority
to terminate tenured faculty for financial reasons.2 1 The court
of appeals concluded that while the Board's authority to dis-
miss employees for reasons of financial exigency was not ex-
pressly granted in the tenure statute, the authority was "im-
plied under the general powers of the board for state
universities governed by ch. 37, Stats. (1971), which provide
that, 'the board of regents shall possess all other powers nec-
essary or convenient to accomplish the objects and perform
the duties prescribed by law.' "22 The court further explained
that a number of jurisdictions already had recognized that
educational governing boards possessed an inherent authority
to discharge tenured faculty in the event of financial exi-
gency.23 To find any differently, the court concluded, would
"fly in the face not only of reason but of authority."2 The
court, therefore, found that the members of the Board of Re-
gents determined, in their discretion, that the legislature's
grant of limited funds required the dismissal of tenured
faculty members and the exercise of such discretion did not
interfere with the protection afforded by the tenure statute.25
The conclusion reached by the federal courts in Johnson
and Krotkoff and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in Graney
would appear to make eminent sense. As recognized by the
Krotkoff and Graney courts, dismissals based upon financial
exigency do not endanger the academic freedom that tenure
20. 92 Wis. 2d 745, 286 N.W.2d 138 (Ct. App. 1979). The Johnson and Graney
cases involved identical parties. After the plaintiff faculty members had failed to ob-
tain an injunction in federal court in Johnson, they brought suit in Wisconsin state
court claiming their dismissals were illegal.
21. Id. at 757, 286 N.W.2d at 144-45.
22. Id. at 757-58, 286 N.W.2d at 145 (quoting Wis. STAT. § 37.02(1) (1971)).
23. See, e.g., Krotkoff v. Goucher College, 585 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1978); Browzin v.
Catholic Univ., 527 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Levitt v. Board of Trustees, 376 F.
Supp. 945 (D. Neb. 1974); Steinmetz v. Board of Trustees, 68 Ill. App. 3d 83, 385
N.E.2d 745 (1978); State ex rel. Frank v. Meigs County Bd. of Educ., 140 Ohio St.
381, 44 N.E.2d 455 (1942); Funston v. District School Bd., 130 Or. 82, 278 P. 1075
(1929); In re Ritzie, 372 Pa. 588, 94 A.2d 729 (1953).
24. 92 Wis. 2d at 762, 286 N.W.2d at 147.
25. Id. at 765, 286 N.W.2d at 149.
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systems are designed to protect. Moreover, the inability of an
educational institution to dismiss tenured faculty members in
the face of severe financial problems could cripple, and even-
tually destroy, many small private colleges. Where state uni-
versities are concerned, to hold that state officials may not en-
gage in retrenchment programs involving the termination of
tenured faculty members in the event of substantial budget
cuts would be contrary to sound public policy and, accord-
ingly, not in the public interest. Thus, there is a strong basis
in reason and authority for finding that university administra-
tors have the inherent authority to dismiss tenured faculty
members for reasons of financial exigency.
IIl. WHAT CONSTITUTES FINANCIAL EXIGENCY?
Because financial exigency as a factual matter is ordinarily
stipulated to or found by the trier of fact, it is difficult to for-
mulate an entirely adequate definition of the term based upon
appellate decisions. A careful review of recent cases and com-
mentaries, however, may help define more precisely the
dimensions of the concept.
In its 1976 Recommendations for Institutional Regula-
tions on Academic Freedom and Tenure,26 the American As-
sociation of University Professors defined financial exigency
as an imminent financial crisis which threatens the survival of
the university as a whole and which cannot be alleviated by
means less drastic than termination of an appointment with
continuous tenure. In addition, the Recommendations insisted
on rather elaborate due process for protection of the faculty,
including faculty participation in the decision that a condition
of financial exigency exists and that all feasible alternatives to
termination of tenured appointments have been pursued. Fi-
nally, the Recommendations endorsed a requirement that
every effort be made to place the threatened faculty member
concerned in another suitable position within the institution
before terminating the appointment.
26. The most relevant portions of this document may be found in Wilson, Finan-
cial Exigency: Examination of Recent Cases Involving Layoff of Tenured Faculty, 4
J. COL. & UNIV. L. 187, 195-97 (1977).
27. Id.
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Courts have not adopted wholesale the rather stringent
standards embodied in the AAUP Recommendations. Finan-
cially exigent conditions, most courts have concluded, need
not threaten the survival of the institution nor affect the insti-
tution as a whole. Further, university administrators are per-
mitted a great deal of discretion in determining what mea-
sures are required to meet the financial xigency and which
appointments are to be terminated.
Shortly before the publication of the 1976 Recommenda-
tions, a New Jersey court, in American Association of Univer-
sity Professors v. Bloomfield College,2 8 applied a standard
somewhat similar to that suggested in the AAUP statement in
ruling that a college had improperly terminated the employ-
ment of thirteen tenured faculty members. The court held
that tenure should be "vigilantly protected," and that dismis-
sals of tenured faculty for reasons of financial exigency should
be allowed only where "the survival of the college is imperiled,
and then only where the good faith of the administration in
seeking the severance of tenured personnel has been clearly
demonstrated as a measure reasonably calculated to preserve
its existence as an academic institution." '29 The court also held
that even though the college had been operating at a deficit
for several years, it did have capital assets which it could have
sold as an alternative to terminating tenured personnel. Thus,
financially exigent conditions of a kind necessary to justify
termination of tenured faculty members were not present.30
Moreover, the court ruled that even had the requisite condi-
tions existed, the college's response in terminating the tenured
faculty members was not a good faith measure reasonably cal-
culated to resolve the financial problems. In addition to termi-
nating the employment of thirteen tenured faculty members,
the college had immediately hired twelve nontenured teach-
ers, and, in effect, had suspended the tenure of all remaining
faculty members. Therefore, the court held that the the ac-
tions of the college administrators were calculated not to deal
with the financial exigency, but rather to do away with the
college's formal system of tenure.3 "
28. 129 N.J. Super. 249, 322 A.2d 846 (1974), affd, 136 N.J. Super. 442, 346 A.2d
615 (1975).
29. Id. at , 322 A.2d at 854.
30. Id. at -, 322 A.2d at 852.
31. Id. at -, 322 A.2d at 856-57.
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On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate
Division, 2 held that the standard applied by the lower court
for determining when financially exigent conditions existed
was too rigorous, and that the evidence adduced at the trial
(as well as the subsequent bankruptcy of the college) was suf-
ficient to show the requisite financial exigency. Further, the
appellate division applied a non-intervention philosophy by
deciding that whether to sell capital assets in order to secure
financial stability on a short-term basis or whether to under-
take the long-term planning involved in the dismissal of ten-
ured faculty members is a policy decision for the institution.
The courts, it stated, should refrain from interfering. " The
court, however, further stated:
The existence of the 'financial exigency' per se does not
necessarily mean that the termination of tenure was proper.
The key factual issue before the court was whether that
financial exigency was the bona fide cause for the decision to
terminate the services of 13 members of the faculty and to
eliminate the tenure of remaining members of the faculty.
Causation and motivation therefore emerged as the prime
factual issue for determinaion by the trial judge. Was the
financial exigency the true bona fide reason for adoption of
the termination resolution?"'
The court ruled that there was credible evidence to support
the trial court's finding that the actions of the university were
not, in good faith, related to the condition of financial exi-
gency, and therefore affirmed the lower court's judgment.
More importantly, however, it refused to adopt a per se rule
which would presume that the college's actions were illegal
and admonished courts to inquire into matters of causation
and motivation.3 5
32. AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 136 N.J. Super. 442, 346 A.2d 615 (1975).
33. Id. at -, 346 A.2d at 617.
34. Id.
35. Id. at, 346 A.2d at 617-18. The court's position in this respect appears quite
sound. Allowing courts or faculty members to second guess the response of university
administration to a bona fide financial crisis would serve to protect neither the
financial stability of the institution nor the academic freedom of the faculty. The
summary question must be one of causation and motive; if the institution's decision
to terminate a tenured faculty member was caused by financial exigency and the uni-
versity has no other improper motive for the termination, then the question of
whether the termination was the best response under the circumstances is a purely
1982]
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In Krotkoff v. Goucher College,3 6 too, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit cited the Bloomfield
case approvingly when holding that whether to sell capital as-
sets instead of diminishing tenured faculty is a policy decision
for the college and not a question for the trier of fact.3 7 Addi-
tionally, the Krotkoff court did not require the college to show
that it was on the verge of bankruptcy in order to justify the
dismissals. The fact that the college had operated at a deficit
from 1968 through 1974 before terminating tenured faculty
members in 1975 was sufficient to show the requisite financial
exigency." It also held, in agreement with the Bloomfield
court, that the dismissal of tenured professors must be bona
fide and that the college must not use financial exigency as a
pretext for subverting academic freedom. Tenured faculty
members had a right, the court stated, to insist that the col-
lege use reasonable standards in selecting the faculty mem-
bers to be terminated and use reasonable efforts to find alter-
native positions for those faculty members within the
institution."9
In the two cases discussed above, financial exigency was
found where a private college had operated at a deficit for sev-
eral years. Financially exigent conditions also have been found
when legislative budget cuts have necessitated the termina-
tion of tenured faculty members at state institutions. A num-
ber of recent cases have held that termination of tenured
faculty members is proper when a state university is faced
with a genuine financial emergency, when the terminations
are part of a uniform set of procedures which are adopted and
applied for the purpose of meeting the emergency, and when
the procedures are not arbitrary or capricious in nature.4 °
administrative one.
36. 585 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1978).
37. Id. at 681.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 682-83. See also Note, Financial Exigency as Cause for Termination of
Tenured Faculty Members in Private Post Secondary Educational Institutions, 62
IOWA L. REv. 481, 504-05 (1976).
40. See, e.g., Brenna v. Southern Colo. State College, 589 F.2d 475 (10th Cir.
1978); Klein v. Board of Higher Educ., 434 F. Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Johnson v.
Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis. 1974), afl'd mem., 510 F.2d 975 (7th
Cir. 1975); Levitt v. Board of Trustees, 376 F. Supp. 945 (D. Neb. 1974).
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Brenna v. Southern Colorado State College"' is just such a
case. There, a state college was forced, by reason of budget
cuts, to reduce its faculty from 340 to 308. The administrators
allocated the budget cuts among various departments of the
college, and department heads were asked to designate the
faculty members they could best get along without. The plain-
tiff, who was tenured, was terminated even though there was
an untenured faculty member in the department. Testimony
showed that one reason the plaintiff was terminated was that
the college had lost its accreditation in the plaintiff's primary
area of training and expertise. The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held that the college's selection of the plaintiff
for termination was proper because the fourteenth amend-
ment did not require the college to use any particular selec-
tion process so long as the procedure chosen was reasonable
and not arbitrary and capricious.42
In Klein v. Board of Higher Education,'43 also, the City
University of New York System suffered a thirteen percent
budget cut in 1976-77. In response to the decreased budget,
the Board of Higher Education formulated certain guidelines
for retrenchment of instructional personnel." The guidelines
provided that the president of each C.U.N.Y. branch would
determine, after consultation with faculty and student repre-
sentatives, which programs should be cut back or eliminated.
Further, the guidelines established certain criteria to be used
in determining which individuals must be terminated, and set
forth procedures for review and appeal of retrenchment deci-
sions. The plaintiffs, eight members of the C.U.N.Y. instruc-
tional staff who lost their positions during the retrenchment
program, claimed that the action of the Board of Higher Edu-
cation was arbitrary and capricious because "the system man-
aged by [the] defendants was allegedly rife with wasteful
practices and defendants knew of the impending budgetary
problems yet did nothing to consult, plan ahead or save
money and simply made 'wholesale' reductions in the instruc-
tional staff at the last moment instead of cutting administra-
41. 589 F.2d 475 (10th Cir. 1978).
42. Id. at 477.
43. 434 F. Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
44. Id. at 1115.
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tive costs. ' 45 The Federal District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York held that the plaintiff's claims were wholly
unsupported by the record. In finding that the terminations
pursuant to the retrenchment program were not arbitrary and
capricious, the federal court stated:
"[W]here lack of funds necessitate[s] releasing a sizeable
number of the faculty, certainly it [is] peculiarly within the
province of the school administration to determine which
teachers should be released, and which retained.
Where there is a showing that the administrative body,
in exercising its judgment, acts from honest convictions,
based upon facts which it believes are for the best interest of
the school, and there is no showing that the acts were arbi-
trary or generated by ill will, fraud, collusion or other such
motives, it is not the province of a court to interfere and
substitute its judgment for that of the administrative
body.14 6
Again, motivation and causation were examined - this time
against the background of the fourteenth amendment. Be-
cause the Board of Higher Education had established a series
of criteria and procedures for determining who would be ter-
minated in response to budget cuts, the court held the Board's
actions to be proper.
In a similar case, Johnson v. Board of Regents,47 the Board
of Regents of the University of Wisconsin adopted policies
and procedures for the layoff of tenured faculty necessitated
by a two and one-half percent reduction in the system's
budget for 1973. The chancellor of each campus was given au-
thority by the central administration to determine which pro-
grams on campus would be subject to budget reductions. A
one-year notice of termination was given to laid-off faculty
members with the provision that efforts would be made to
find another place for them within the university system. Pro-
visions also were made for review and reconsideration of the
termination decisions.4 8 A group of tenured faculty members
who had received notice pursuant to the procedures set up to
45. Id. at 1116.
46. Id. at 1118 (quoting Levitt v. Board of Trustees, 376 F. Supp. 945, 950 (D.
Neb. 1974)).
47. 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis. 1974), aff'd mem., 510 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1975).
48. Id. at 230-34.
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deal with the budget reductions brought an action in federal
court seeking an injunction to prevent the university system
from laying them off. In refusing to grant the injunction, the
federal court stated that the university had been faced with
financial exigency, and the decision to lay off certain tenured
personnel was a "legislative determination" with which the
court would not interfere so long as the action was not arbi-
trary or capricious. 49
In the foregoing cases, the universities all faced the
financial conditions affecting the university or university sys-
tem as a whole. Courts also have considered the propriety of
terminating tenured faculty members for reasons of financial
exigency when only one department or program of the college
or university had been affected by the financial problems.
In Rose v. Elmhurst College,50 Mr. Rose had been em-
ployed as an assistant professor of religion at Elmhurst Col-
lege in 1967, and had been granted tenure in 1971. The ad-
ministration had made significant cutbacks in funding for the
religion department in 1975, and Mr. Rose's employment was
discontinued in 1976. The Illinois Court of Appeals held that
the uncontradicted evidence showed the curtailment of the re-
ligion department was due to declining enrollments, and there
was no suggestion in the record that the action of the college
was in bad faith or arbitrarily directed at Mr. Rose individu-
ally. Thus, the termination of the plaintiff's employment was
proper.5 1
Similarly, in Scheuer v. Creighton University,52 an assis-
tant professor of pharmacy was terminated under the "finan-
cial exigency" clause of his employment contract. The phar-
macy program at the university relied primarily on federal
"capitation funds ' 53 for its yearly budget. While the federal
funding had increased from 1971 through 1976, the depart-
ment had continued to operate at a deficit. In 1975, the vice-
president for the Health Services Division of the university
49. Id. at 238-39.
50. 62 Ill. App. 3d 824, 379 N.E.2d 791 (1978).
51. Id. at -, 379 N.E.2d at 793-94.
52. 199 Neb. 618, 260 N.W.2d 595 (1977).
53. Under a capitation funding program, the funding granted to a particular
school, college or program is directly proportionate to the number of enrolled
students.
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learned that not only was the department facing a larger defi-
cit in the 1976-77 school year, but also the federal funds avail-
able for the department would be reduced.54 In response to
the deficit and budget cuts, the Health Services Division took
a number of steps to cut costs in the department, including
the termination of Professor Scheuer's employment. Scheuer
thereafter brought an action in state court claiming that the
"financial exigency" clause in his contract contemplated
financial problems which threatened the survival of the insti-
tution as a whole and not merely one department or college.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska rejected this argument:
To accept plaintiffs definition would require Creighton to
continue programs running up large deficits so long as the
institution as a whole had financial resources available to it.
The inevitable result of this type operation would be to
spread the financial exigency in one school or department to
the entire University. This could likely result in the closing
of the entire institution.55
Therefore, the court held that the term "financial exigency"
as used in the professor's contract of employment could refer
to financial exigency in a department or college of the univer-
sity, and was not restricted to one existing in the institution
as a whole.
These and other cases generally indicate that courts will
not adopt standards as stringent as those suggested in the
Recommendations of the American Association of University
Professors. 6 Instead, courts have allowed university officials
fairly broad discretion in determining when financial exigency
exists and when termination of tenured faculty members is a
step reasonably calculated to ease the financial problems. Op-
erating deficits and budget cuts will generally be viewed by
the courts as giving rise to financial exigency. Such exigency
54. 199 Neb. at -, 260 N.W.2d at 596.
55. Id. at -, 260 N.W.2d at 600.
56. A university administration could bind itself to meet the standards articulated
in the AAUP Recommendations by adopting those standards in a faculty handbook
or in individual employment contracts. In light of the increasing number of tenured
faculty terminations based on financial exigency and because courts have generally
imposed less stringent standards upon university officials, administrators will un-
doubtedly encounter increasing pressure from faculty members to adopt standards
similar to those recommended by the AAUP.
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may exist in a single department or college of a university
rather than in the institution as a whole. Although university
officials should seek to avoid the termination of tenured
faculty members as a response to financial problems, they
nevertheless are not required to liquidate the university's cap-
ital assets as an alternative to a cutback in personnel. If
faculty terminations are required, the university should at-
tempt to place the faculty member in any other suitable em-
ployment within the university or system. Administrators also
should adopt reasonable and fair policies and procedures for
determining which faculty members should be dismissed. If
these guidelines are followed, a prima facie showing will have
been made that any terminations on these grounds are a bona
fide response to financial exigency rather than a mere pretext
for subverting academic freedom.
IV. DUE PROCESS AND BURDEN OF PROOF
If a university must terminate a tenured faculty member
as a reasonable and bona fide response to financial exigency, it
must then be determined whether the faculty member has a
right to a hearing at which he may challenge the determina-
tion made by university officials. Where a faculty handbook,
or the individual faculty member's contract of employment,
provides specifically for a pretermination hearing, the termi-
nated faculty member has a right to such a hearing.57 Where
there is no express contractual provision for a hearing, courts
have generally required university officials to provide a ten-
ured faculty member some due process when he is terminated
for reasons of financial exigency. However, they have not
deemed it to be constitutionally necessary to provide a hear-
ing prior to the termination.
In Johnson v. Board of Regents,58 the Federal District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin concluded that
tenured professors, who had been dismissed by the Board of
Regents in response to budget cuts, had sufficient interest in
their employment to be afforded "minimal procedural protec-
tion." The court held, however, that a decision to discontinue
employment based upon grounds of financial exigency is a
57. See Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 431 F. Supp. 1379 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
58. 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis. 1974), afl'd mem., 510 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1975).
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"legislative" rather than "adjudicatory" decision, and that the
procedural safeguards required by the due process clause
were, therefore, different from those required when a faculty
member is dismissed for cause.5 9 The court further stated that
faculty members need not be allowed to participate in termi-
nation decisions, and that the minimal procedures required by
the fourteenth amendment may be provided after, rather than
before, the decision has been made to lay off particular ten-
ured faculty." In order to satisfy the fourteenth amendment,
the minimal safeguards should include: (1) furnishing each af-
fected faculty member with a reasonably adequate written
statement of the basis for the initial decision to lay off; (2)
furnishing each faculty member with a reasonably adequate
description of the manner in which the initial decision had
been arrived at; (3) making a reasonably adequate disclosure
to each faculty member of the information and data upon
which the decisionmakers had relied; and (4) providing each
faculty member the opportunity to respond. 1 Similarly, the
courts in Bignall v. North Idaho College,6 2 and Klein v. Board
of Higher Education,3 held that tenured faculty members
whose employment had been discontinued due to financial ex-
igency were not entitled to a hearing prior to termination de-
cisions, and had no constitutional right to participate in the
formulation of retrenchment programs.
Based upon these decisions, it is clear that just as courts
have generally adopted a policy of judicial nonintervention
with respect to purely administrative decisions,6 4 neither will
they allow faculty members to interfere with processes which
are properly left to university officials. Therefore, so long as
administrators provide the affected faculty member with a
reasonably adequate statement of the reasons for the dismis-
59. Id. at 237-40.
60. Id. at 239.
61. Id. at 240. The American Association of University Professors was highly criti-
cal of the due process protection provided by the Johnson court, stating that the
"protection was minimal indeed, in that the court declined to prescribe any faculty
participation in the separation decisions, once 'reasonably adequate' statements of
reasons were provided by the administration, with some opportunity for the faculty
member to respond." The Bloomfield College Case, 60 AAUP BULL. 320 (1974).
62. 538 F.2d 243, 245-46 (9th Cir. 1976).
63. 434 F. Supp. 1113, 1118-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
64. See supra note 33.
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sal, an explanation of the manner in which the decision was
made, and an opportunity to challenge the propriety of the
grounds for dismissal, both academic freedom and the integ-
rity of the educational institution are preserved.
While most courts have agreed that a tenured faculty
member has a right to a hearing regarding his termination for
reasons of financial exigency, courts are split on the question
of who bears the burden of proof with respect to whether
financial exigency truly exists and whether the termination
was reasonable.
In both American Association of University Professors v.
Bloomfield College, 5 and Bignall v. North Idaho College,8
the institutions used the 1940 AAUP statement concerning
termination of tenured faculty members when formulating
their faculty handbooks. The colleges had, for example, pro-
vided that faculty members could be terminated "under ex-
traordinary circumstances because of financial exigency," and
that the termination of continuous employment "because of
financial exigency of the institution must be demonstrably
bona fide." The courts in both instances understood these
provisions of the faculty handbook to be part of the contract
of employment between the faculty members and the institu-
tions. The courts went on to hold that the existence of a
"bona fide financial exigency" was a condition precedent to
the termination of tenured faculty members, and under the
basic principle of contract law, the colleges would bear the
burden of proving the existence of the conditions.8
A very different view was taken by the courts in Johnson
v. Board of Regents68 and Levitt v. Board of Trustees."9
There, neither state institution appeared to have adopted con-
ditions for the termination of tenured faculty members for
reasons of financial exigency. The courts held that even
though the plaintiffs had a fourteenth amendment right to at
least a post-termination hearing, the terminated faculty mem-
bers carried the burden of proof regarding the nonexistence of
65. 136 N.J. Super. 442, 346 A.2d 615 (1975).
66. 538 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1976).
67. See Bignall v. North Idaho College, 538 F.2d 243, 249 (9th Cir. 1976); AAUP
v. Bloomfield College, 136 N.J. Super. 442, -, 346 A.2d 615, 616-17 (1975).
68. 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis. 1974), aff'd mem., 510 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1975).
69. 376 F. Supp. 945 (D. Neb. 1974).
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financial exigency or the unreasonableness of the procedures
adopted to evaluate and select those faculty members whose
employment would be discontinued.70
One recent commentator has suggested that the different
results reached by the courts regarding burden of proof might
be explained in terms of the courts' differing analytical ap-
proaches. In Bloomfield and BignalU, the courts took a "con-
tractual" approach, that is, the courts viewed the provisions in
the faculty handbook as part of a contract and allotted the
burden of proof based upon contract principles. In Johnson
and Levitt, the courts took a "constitutional" view, that is,
the courts saw the hearing as being required by the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment, and placed the bur-
den of proof on the party challenging the sufficiency of the
grounds for termination. 1
If a differing judicial analysis produces differing results
with respect to burden of proof, colleges and universities
would be well advised to refrain from including in their
faculty handbooks or by-laws any provisions or conditions re-
lating to their authority to terminate the employment of ten-
ured faculty members for reasons of financial exigency. The
inclusion of such provisions or conditions may well encourage
a court to adopt a "contractual" analysis and thereby place
the burden of proof upon the institutions. Conversely, by
avoiding such provisions or conditions, the burden of proof in
a termination hearing probably would rest with the faculty
member. Faculty members or their representative organiza-
tions undoubtedly will attempt to have such provisions or
conditions inserted in their individual contracts, the faculty
handbook, or the university by-laws. Universities, on the other
hand, undoubtedly will seek the opposite.
V. CONCLUSION
Where state statutes, university by-laws, faculty hand-
books, or individual employment contracts so provide, univer-
sity officials have the authority to dismiss tenured faculty
70. See Johnson v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227, 240 (W.D. Wis. 1974);
Levitt v. Board of Trustees, 376 F. Supp. 945, 950 (D.C. Neb. 1974).
71. See generally Wilson, Financial Exigency: Examination of Recent Cases In-
volving Layoff of Tenured Faculty, 4 J. COL. & UNiv. L. 187 (1977).
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members for reasons of financial exigency. Moreover, even
where no authority has been explicitly granted, courts have
held that the power to dismiss based upon financial problems
is an inherent power vested in university officials. Courts have
generally recognized that to hold otherwise would be to impair
severely the financial stability of educational institutions. The
definition of "financial exigency" can best be determined by
looking to the fact situations of cases in which such conditions
were found to exist. While operational deficits and budget
cuts affecting the institution as a whole will ordinarily be
found to be sufficient financial exigency, several courts have
found that financial problems in a single department or col-
lege may be an adequate basis for dismissal of tenured
faculty.
In determining whether the dismissal of tenured faculty
members is a bona fide response to a true financial emergency,
courts must strike a careful balance between the institution's
need to maintain financial stability and the faculty members'
rights to continued employment. On the one hand, a
purported financial exigency must not serve as a mere pretext
for the improper dismissal of tenured faculty members and
thereby undermine academic freedom. On the other hand, so
long as academic freedom is adequately protected, neither
courts nor faculty members should be allowed to interfere
with the purely administrative process of diverting the im-
pending financial disaster.
Although the "minimal due process" standard adopted by
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Johnson v. Board of
Regents has come under some criticism, the standard appears
to strike a reasonably good balance. By requiring university
officials to provide the dismissed faculty member with a rea-
sonably adequate statement of the reasons for his dismissal,
an explanation of the manner in which the termination deci-
sion was made, and an opportunity to challenge the dismissal,
academic freedom is sufficiently protected. By adopting a pol-
icy of judicial nonintervention, and similarly preventing
faculty members from interfering in the administrative deci-
sion-making process, the administrative and financial integ-
rity of the institution is preserved.
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